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ABSTRACT
Container barging has gained in importance in port-related
transport along with the need for sustainable transport.
Nevertheless, coordination problems between terminal operator
and barge operator exist, and performance lags behind. This
paper analyses factors that may hinder or stimulate a better future
performance of container barging in the port of Rotterdam. A
case study is accomplished and guided by a framework rooted in
Institutional Economics. Despite favourable conditions set by
governments and the port authority, the share of container
barging has hardly grown. The container barging sector in
Rotterdam is embedded in a history with many alliances, a high
degree of organisation, and a good track record in the
development of institutional arrangements to solve coordination
problems. However, the present contractual relations in the
transport chain form an inadequate condition. From a theoretical
perspective, the paper shows the value of studying port-related
transport chains by acknowledging their institutional context.
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Introduction
Containerisation has led to an increase in international trade of manufactured goods. It
has also increased competition between ports (Slack 1993) and put pressure on the use
of scarce hinterland infrastructure. Having eﬃcient port-related transport, including infra-
structural access to the hinterland and the availability of transport services, is considered
to be crucial in today’s competition between ports (cf. Tongzon 2009). Moreover, the use
of rail transport and Inland Waterway Transport is seen as a keystone for sustainable
development of transport and ports. However, in these intermodal transport chains,
eﬃciency does not always develop spontaneously, because it is characterised by sequential
interdependencies, multiple transport modes, diﬀerent industrial practices and organis-
ational arrangements (Jaﬀee 2016).
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This paper focuses on port-related container transport by barge in the port of Rotter-
dam, the largest container port in northwest Europe. Because of the favourable environ-
mental performance of Inland Waterway Transport (IWT) and the almost unlimited
capacity of infrastructure, the policy of the Dutch government and the Rotterdam Port
Authority is to realise a ‘modal shift’ in favour of IWT (Port of Rotterdam 2011; Ministry
of Infrastructure and the Environment 2015). Despite these policy goals, the share of con-
tainer barging hardly grows. At the same time, it is observed that the performance of con-
tainer barging in Rotterdam is quite ineﬃcient. Earlier research showed that a major
critical interdependency is between the deep-sea terminal operators and the hinterland
transportation company (Van der Horst and De Langen 2015; Jaﬀee 2016). Coordination
problems between both lead to long turnaround times of barges and ineﬃcient terminal
planning. In reality, it seems diﬃcult to improve these coordination problems.
The goal of this research is to analyse factors that may hinder or stimulate a better future
performance of container barging in the port of Rotterdam. The next section describes the
research methodology guided by a framework rooted in New Institutional Economics (Wil-
liamson1998) that oﬀers a starting point todiscuss contextual variables related to the informal
and formal institutional environment, market organisation and institutional arrangements.
Section 3 provides the results. The last section synthesises the results of the study.
Research methodology and framework
In this research, a single case study approach was adopted. A case study is relevant because
it aims at an in-depth understanding of the ‘why’ of a contemporary phenomenon. In this
paper, we investigate why the performance of container barging sector in the port of Rot-
terdam is ineﬃcient and which contextual factors (causes) hinder or stimulate its perform-
ance. Furthermore, a single case study is relevant because the issue is local (Rotterdam-
based) and unique. The literature on IWT of containers is limited and good learning
experiences are hard to ﬁnd. This can be explained by the small number of ports where
container barging has an important market share. In Europe, for instance, container
barging is only well developed in the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam (cf. Konings
2007 or Caris, Macharis, and Janssens 2011). Also learning experiences can be gained
from France (Frémont, Franc, and Slack 2009) or China (Notteboom 2007).
The study contained four research steps. Firstly, 15 interviews were held with actors
active in the container barge hinterland chain (barge operator, deep-sea terminal operator,
and inland terminal operator). In addition, representatives of the sector associations as
well as experts and academics in the ﬁeld of ship ﬁnance, business history, (inland) trans-
port law, and port management contributed and were interviewed. During the interviews,
the following working hypothesis provided the basis for discussion: ‘The container barging
sector in the port of Rotterdam is unable to pick-up the expected future role, namely pro-
viding eﬃcient hinterland transport for maritime containers in 2030.’ The interviews were
helpful to make a set of subjects related to reasons behind coordination problems in con-
tainer barging. In other words, the interviews set the boundaries between phenomena and
contextual factors which are not clearly evident in case study research (Yin 2008). The
interviews also guided the selection of the data sources. Thirdly, desk research was exe-
cuted and, simultaneously, a multi-disciplinary framework was devised (shown in
Figure 1). Finally, the results were reviewed by an external committee, including
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representatives from the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, Rotterdam Port
Authority and the National Institute for Advanced Logistics.
In this qualitative ‘process of inquiry’, the combination of triangulation is important
(Patton 1987). Four common forms of triangulation (Yin 2008) can be justiﬁed. We
used multiple methods (methodological triangulation) such as interviews, workshops
with experts, and desk research to achieve greater accuracy and a more coherent interpret-
ation. By using a review group evaluator triangulation is justiﬁed. By using diﬀerent data
sources from diﬀerent research ﬁelds, we can validate the theory and data triangulation.
For the framework, consideration of New Institutional Economics (Williamson 1998)
formed the starting point. Williamson’s work has its origin in Transaction Cost Econ-
omics (TCE), dealing with matching categories of transactions with categories of
eﬃcient governance structures (Williamson 1981). Later, Williamson (1993) suggested
that governance does not operate in isolation, but categorical context factors (causes)
play a role. The framework aims at identifying causes for the ineﬃcient performance of
container barging in the port of Rotterdam. Possible causes for this ‘economic reality’
(on layer 4) lie in the institutions on layers 1, 2, and 3. Following the inﬂuential deﬁnition
of North (2005), institutions may be seen as humanly devised constraints that structure
political, economic and social interactions. A comparable institutional approach was
earlier applied in port research (De Langen and Chouly 2004), and other infrastructure
markets like electricity (Künneke and Fens 2007), and wireless infrastructure (WiFi)
(Lemstra, Hayes, and Groenewegen 2010). The framework distinguishes between
diﬀerent types of institution inspired by diﬀerent theoretical approaches. This multi-dis-
ciplinary perspective is the ﬁrst important value of the framework. Borrowing other suit-
able theoretical lenses is a rather common practise in transport and logistics research (cf.
Stock 1997). Secondly, the framework gives coherence to empirical inquiry. Figure 1 shows
that institutions are not developing randomly but are interrelated with certain logic with a
hypothetical time period for change. At level 1 of the framework, we ﬁnd informal insti-
tutions which are based on broad beliefs, values and norms that inﬂuence the behaviour of
economic actors. These informal institutions are assumed to be deeply rooted in society
Figure 1 Framework. Source: adapted from Williamson (1998).
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and only change over a very long period of time (according to Williamson, between 100
and 1000 years). They emerge spontaneously within the social context and stay in the
domain of economic historians and economic sociologists. Level 2 refers to formal or
legal embeddedness. Here, according to Williamson (1998), the laws regarding property
rights – their deﬁnition and enforcement – are prominently featured. Moreover, it
includes the area of formal governmental policy, and property and decision rights.
Periods of change at this level are between 10 and 100 years. The third level concerns
market organisation, ﬁrms and other institutional arrangements. The relevant theoretical
lens here is Transaction Cost Economics. Periods of change are quite short, namely
between 1 and 10 years. Resource allocation, behaviour and performance by the market
actors are described at the fourth level. The arrows connecting higher levels with lower
levels mean that the higher level imposes constraints on the level immediately below.
Although Williamson recognises that the system is fully interconnected, he tends to
neglect the feedback links. While the purpose of this study is to ﬁnd causes of a ‘market
reality’, we consider the feedback arrows in the framework from level 4 to 1. In this
respect, we see institutions as constraints as well as instruments to provide a structure
for human interaction that regulates the behaviour of actors.
Results of case study: application of the framework
In this section, the framework will be applied to container barging in the port of Rotter-
dam. The following section introduces the market actors and their interactions. The
second section presents some key data to illustrate the performance of container
barging in the port of Rotterdam. Next, we discuss the most relevant elements in the
context of the container barge sector, namely the informal institutions, formal institutions,
and the institutional arrangements.
Market actors in the container barge transport chain
Figure 2 shows the main market actors involved in container barge transport. There are
three actors on the demand side of the transport chain, namely the shipper, freight forwar-
der or the carrier. Primarily, a shipper is the owner of the goods and creates the demand
for transport. Commissioned by the shipper, freight forwarders could arrange hinterland
transport; they do not own vessels or terminals but purchase transport and terminal ser-
vices from third parties. Although deep-sea carriers are traditionally responsible for sea-
borne transport, they could also be involved in organising hinterland transport of the
container by barge (carrier haulage).
Figure 2 Hinterland transport chain of container barging.
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On the supply side, three actors play a role in the provision of container barging, namely:
the barge operator, the private barge company or skipper, and inland terminal operator. The
core business of the barge operator is organising container barge transport by providing fre-
quent shuttle services between the deep-sea and inland terminals. In Rotterdam, 70% of con-
tainer barge transport is organised by barge operators (Port of Rotterdam 2016). The inland
terminal operators handle the container ﬂows arriving by barge, oﬀer storage capacity and
transfer the containers to trucks for ﬁnal transport to the shipper. An inland terminal oper-
ator can also act as a barge operator; they organise barge transport and contract with skip-
pers. Both the barge operator and the inland terminal hire ship capacity from skippers with
short- or long-term contracts. The skippers oﬀer barge capacity (including crew) for a ﬁxed
period; the barge and inland terminal operator oﬀer the logistics management.
Performance of container barging in port of Rotterdam
Rotterdam is the largest container port in Europe. In 2015, the container throughput was
12.2 million TEU (the twenty-foot equivalent unit). About 70% of the containers handled
(8.5 million TEU) have an origin or destination in the hinterland of Rotterdam. The
remaining 30% are for sea-sea transhipment (Port of Rotterdam 2016). In 2013, the
Port of Rotterdam completed the Maasvlakte 2 Project. This port extension project
enlarged the port area with roughly 1000 hectares, of which 600 hectares is used by con-
tainer terminals. The Maasvlakte area is situated directly on the North Sea and is the ideal
location to accommodate the largest container ships. Most containers are currently
handled in the Maasvlakte area. In the hinterland transport of containers, road transport
has a dominant position. To be able to transport the growing volumes of containers in an
eﬃcient and sustainable way, the Port Authority states that it is necessary that IWT will be
making up a larger share in the transport system. In their strategic plan ‘Port Vision 2030’
(Port of Rotterdam 2011), a desired modal split is formulated in favour of container trans-
port by barge and train of 65% for the total Maasvlakte port area in 2030. The ambition for
container barging is to realise a modal split of 45%. This change in the modal split was
contractually agreed upon with the new terminal operators on the Maasvlakte: APM
Terminals and Rotterdam World Gateway.
Although Rotterdam has good natural conditions, such as the location of the port at the
estuary of the river Rhine (the most important inland waterway for freight transport in
Europe), and container volumes handled in the port are increasing, the development of
IWT remains stable (Table 1). A core reason for the inability to make container
barging more eﬃcient and let its modal split share increase is related to coordination pro-
blems in the port operations. Two coordination problems are particularly relevant.
Table 1. Development of modal split in Maasvlakte area for selected years (%).
2002 2006 2010 2012 2013 2015a
2030
Ambition
Barge 41.1 38.3 39.9 42.9 42.3 41.6 65
Rail 12.5 13.2 12.9 12.8 12.4 12.2
Truck 46.4 48.5 47.2 44.3 45.3 46.2 35
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
Source: Port of Rotterdam (2011, 2015).
aOnly Q1 and Q2.
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The long duration of (un)loading cargo in the port, caused by the many calls and the
small call sizes per terminal, is the ﬁrst coordination problem. All barge operators call at a
variety of terminals in the port and load or unload limited numbers of containers per
terminal. The so-called call size in Rotterdam is relatively small, with an average of 33.3
containers per terminal. There is an important diﬀerence in the call size between terminals
active in the Maasvlakte area and the rest of the terminal, mainly active in the Waal/Eem-
haven area (40 km from the sea). In general, the average call size is higher in the Maasv-
lakte port area, namely 41.3 containers, although there are large diﬀerences between the
lowest call size (24 containers) and the highest call size (51 containers) (Port of Rotterdam
2013). The average call size in Waal/Eemhaven is 19.4 containers. These ﬁndings corre-
spond to the fact that the average rotation time of a barge is long and varies from 21 h
for smaller vessels [<85 m) to 36 h (larger vessels) (Port of Rotterdam 2013)].
The second coordination problem is related to the relationship between the barge oper-
ator and the deep-sea terminal operator and deals with inadequate terminal and quay
planning for barge handling. Tighter operational planning could reduce rotation times
but barges frequently cannot be handled as planned. In the port of Rotterdam, for 41%
of the calls by barging, the actual handling at the deep-sea terminal deviated by less
than 2 h from the planned start time; 59% of barges are therefore handled outside −2/
+2 h of the start time (Port of Rotterdam 2013).
Informal institutions
In the analytical framework shown in Figure 1, the informal institutions are positioned at
the highest level. Institutional economists believe that informal institutions emerge spon-
taneously and endogenously. Once adopted by society or a sector they may ‘lock in’ over
generations and become a part of the set of broad beliefs, values and norms. In our study,
we found that the IWT sector can be characterised as individualistic, where cooperation
and coordination are not manifest. Sector associations or socioeconomic interest groups
can be mentioned as a way to enable large groups of actors.
The socioeconomic representation in IWT in the Netherlands has fragmented over the
years – from the 1920s, a wide range of socioeconomic interest groups exist. From this
early period, the mentality of about 10,000 private skippers was characterised as highly
individualistic and limping between two opinions: a skipper felt they were neither a
‘worker’ nor a ‘patron’ (Van Zuuren 1992). Following the Great War in 1918, socioeco-
nomic interest groups were formed based on ideology or religion. A crisis in 1929 led
to the Act of Proportional Freight Distribution in 1933. The aim of this Act was to
spread the available cargo amongst skippers on a rotation list. The ship registered the
longest was assigned to the ﬁrst suitable trip. Despite industrial growth and modernisation
of the ﬂeet, this Act led to the further division of socioeconomic interest groups.
In the early 1970s, the European Commission wanted to abolish the Act on Pro-
portional Freight Distribution. This divided the skippers in the Federation of Skippers
Union, who wanted to adopt a more commercial market approach, and the group of Inde-
pendent Dutch Skippers Union. The 1980s were characterised by many shifts in member-
ship among the two Unions: socioeconomic interest groups that stepped in and out. In the
early 1990s, there were two socioeconomic organisations: the so-called ‘Kantoor Binnen-
vaart’ (literally translated as Oﬃce Inland Shipping) and the Dutch Central Bureau for
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Rhine and Inland Navigation, the entrepreneurs’ and employers’ association representing
owners and operators of inland vessels. In 1995, attempts were made to form one umbrella
organisation by assembling three organisations: Schuttevaer, Kantoor Binnenvaart and the
Dutch Central Bureau for Rhine and Inland Navigation. This initiative collapsed when the
subsidy from the national government stopped in 1999. The result was that there were 10
socioeconomic interest groups at the beginning of the twentieth century. From 2013
onwards two socioeconomic organisations exist: the Dutch Central Bureau for Rhine
and Inland Navigation and Royal BLN-Schuttevaer.
From the perspective of interest groups, it can be concluded that collaboration between
individual skippers in the Netherlands is fragmented and shows a history of ‘trial and
error’. Although collective action is not obvious, the sector is embedded in a long tradition
of horizontal and vertical coordination. Whether a skipper chooses horizontal and vertical
coordination varies considerably according to (geographic) market segments, motives, and
diﬀerent time periods. The question of whether a skipper chooses the vertical or horizontal
way has depended on several factors and varied greatly per period. Verrips (1991) con-
cludes that this behaviour shows a ‘chameleonic ability’ of the sector. In general, the hori-
zontal strategy took place in economically diﬃcult times when prices were low and the
bargaining power of shippers and charterers was too high. By working together, skippers
formed a united front against shippers and charterers. In the vertical strategy, skippers
tried to be on good terms with charterers and shippers, after economic recovery.
Most of the interviewees agreed that the container barge sector became a mature trans-
port sector because of horizontal cooperation. Van Driel (2000) notes that the initial phase
of container shipping in the 1970s was strongly characterised by horizontal cooperation as
a response to two factors: high investment in new vessels and the establishment of sched-
uled services in a new market being risky. Many of the ﬁrst barge operators in Rotterdam
participated in the so-called Fahrgemeinschaften in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. A
Fahrgemeinschaft is a form of horizontal cooperation between barge operators with a
joint sailing schedule combined with a proﬁt pool. Despite the ability of the sector as a
whole to adapt well to changes in the environment (an illustration of its chameleonic
ability), most of the interviewees and market studies (e.g. STC-NESTRA 2015) note
that on the level of individual entrepreneurs, the IWT sector demonstrates conservative
entrepreneurial behaviour. The sector has a long tradition of family businesses. The
vessel serves not only as an asset but also as a home. On the one hand, family businesses
are ﬁnancially vulnerable, caused mainly by the fact that families own one ship with high
ﬁxed costs and less variable costs, and where only the fuel costs can be treated as a variable
cost (between 10% and 25%). On the other hand, the presence of family businesses is also
positive in their daily operations with respect to working hours and their ability to adapt to
trends such as information and communications technology (Hubens 2004). This adapta-
bility and ﬂexibility are very important in modern logistics practice (Naim et al. 2006).
Formal institutions
The next level of analysis is the legal embeddedness of the sector. In our study, two important
conditions related to the formal institutional environment were stressed by interviewees and
further analysed, namely the formal governmental policy by the European Union (EU) and
the Dutch government, and the division of the property and decision rights between actors
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in the port and its hinterland. The European Commission sees ITW as an energy-eﬃcient
mode of transport. Therefore, Inland Waterway Transport should receive a larger share in
the distribution of transport modes. According to the White Paper (European Commission
2011), 30% of all goods transported by road over more than 300 km should be transported
by rail or Inland Waterway Transport by 2030. In 2050 it is expected that the share increases
to50%.Compared to earlierEuropeanpolicies, recentpolicymakingpaysmore attention to the
potential of IWT. Europe also wants to create an integrated transport network by using the
instrument of regulation. In 2011, a new proposal for regulation was introduced: the Trans-
European Networks – Transport (TEN-T) guidelines based on proposals from individual
Member States. To date 30 infrastructural projects have been identiﬁed. These so-called Pri-
ority Projects were chosen according to both their ‘European added value’ and their contri-
bution to the sustainable development of transport. The 30 key projects consist of 18
railway projects, three mixed rail-road projects, two IWT projects, and one short-sea shipping
project. This choice reﬂects a high priority towards more environmentally friendly transport
modes. Also at the level of the national government, growth in the share of inland shipping
is seen as important for the well-functioning transport system for the Dutch economy. In
this context, the government together with local authorities and businesses will improve the
utilisation of the main (inter) national hinterland connections, and thus achieve more
eﬃcient use of multi-modal terminals and surrounding business parks. Policy objectives
focus on the elimination of maintenance backlogs and bottlenecks in inland waterway infra-
structure, better use of existing infrastructure, sustainable transport, safety, reliable travel
times, and reducing the administrative burden by ensuring better-quality information. In
Figure 3 Actors and contractual relations in container barging chain. Adapted from: Van der Horst and
De Langen (2015).
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addition, innovationhas a prominent position on the policy agenda (Ministry of Infrastructure
and the Environment 2015).
Figure 3 shows all possible contractual relations that actors in the container barge chain
could possibly have with each other. The ﬁgure shows that the container stevedore has a
contract with the container shipping line. In this contract, the terminal handling charges
are agreed. The container shipping line pays the stevedore for three services: (1) the trans-
fer from deep-sea vessel to the container stack, (2) the temporary storage of containers at a
stack in the terminal, and (3) the transfer to the hinterland mode (barge, rail or truck).
There is no contractual relationship between the barge operator, on the one hand, and
the deep-sea terminal operator, on the other. Such a contract would provide an incentive
to both parties to better match the quay planning of the container stevedore and the sailing
plan of the barge operator. Most of the interviewees and expert opinion mentioned that
these missing contractual relations and the fact that stevedores give priorities to container
shipping lines hinder the improvement of handling container barges. Some interviewees
added that the absence of contractual relations is even worse because container barges
are mostly handled along the same quays as deep-sea vessels in the present situation. In
addition, between 70% and 80% of container hinterland transport in Rotterdam is organ-
ised by what is termed merchant haulage. In this case, transport is organised by a forwar-
der or shipper. These parties have in the current contract structure a very limited impact
on the performance of the container stevedore and barge operator in the port. In the case
of carrier haulage, container shipping could encourage stevedore companies or the barge
operator to perform better.
The same ﬁgure shows that there is no contract between the barge operator and the
infrastructure manager. The main reason for the missing contractual relation can be
found in the Mannheim Convention on Navigation on the Rhine from 1868. The
guiding principles of the Rhine Regime are freedom of navigation for the ships of all
estuary nations (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland), equality
of treatment of domestic and foreign vessels, uniform administration, and the elimination
of all tolls or other ﬁscal exactions levied solely on the right to navigate (CCR 1868). Due to
the principles of the Mannheim Convention, there is no formal relationship between the
barge operator or skipper and the owner and infrastructure manager for the use of the
waterway at a particular place and a particular time. This limits the guidance of behaviour
to achieve more eﬃcient use of the port’s infrastructure. In comparison, in rail transport,
there is a formalised connection between the rail operator and the rail infrastructure
manager. In the so-called access agreement, the contract between an operator and the
port’s infrastructure manager, there are numerous operational rules, bonuses and penalties
that stimulate the eﬃcient use of infrastructure.
Institutional arrangements
A preliminary conclusion from the previous sections is that, on the one hand, there are
favourable geographical conditions, stimulating policies by European and Dutch govern-
ments and port authority, positive cultural characteristics such as a long tradition in hori-
zontal and vertical cooperation, and entrepreneurs in container barging having a future-
oriented and ﬂexible focus. On the other hand, the modal split of inland container trans-
port has remained stable for years, the present contractual relations in the container barge
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chain do not support the improvement of coordination, and the sector is embedded in a
conservative culture where collective action is not manifest.
Starting from the notion that collective action is not manifest, associations or interest
groups are often proposed as a way to enable groups of actors (Olson 2009). Examining
barge and inland terminal operators, it is relevant to consider their membership of the
Member Group Container Operators of the Dutch Central Bureau for Rhine and
Inland Navigation (CBRB) and the Association of Inland Terminal Operators (VITO).
According to the ﬁrst-named association, members of the Group Container Operators
Members organise 70% of container transport volumes on the Rhine, between Rotterdam
and Antwerp and in the BeNeLux countries (CBRB 2016). About half of the container
shuttles from/to the port of Rotterdam are organised by a member of the Group
Members Container Operators. The degree of organisation of inland terminal operators
is lower than that of the inland operators, namely 23%. This low percentage can be
explained by the fact that VITO is a Dutch association; inland terminal operators from
Belgium, France or Germany cannot become a member. Almost all Dutch terminal oper-
ators are members of VITO. In total, 70% of the container shuttles in Rotterdam are
organised by members of these two interest groups (Port of Rotterdam 2013).
A second general observation is that the container barge sector in the port of Rotterdam
has a good track record in the development of institutional arrangements to increase the
eﬃciency of container barging in the port. There is high involvement of barge operators,
but also non-barging actors like deep-sea terminal operators and the port authority are
involved in improving coordination. The barge operators are mainly involved in alliances.
A recent example is the alliance between the barge operators H&S Container Line, Danser
Containerline and Ultra-Brag in 2016 (via mutual Vessel Sharing Agreements), where
barge operators bundle volumes of container traﬃc from several inland ports along the
Upper Rhine and optimise both utilisation of their barges and, because of larger call
sizes, they improve the port turnaround time.
We observe that the earlier observed long tradition in horizontal cooperation is still
deeply rooted in the sector. Initiatives in which barge operators integrate vertically
within the chain are hardly seen. Vertical integration in the container barge chain is
only seen by deep-sea terminal operators. In Rotterdam, two institutional arrangements
were established in which the deep-sea terminal operator, as the ‘unusual party’, takes
the lead in organising container barge transport. In 2010, the Rotterdam container steve-
dore ECT introduced a new concept called the ‘Extended Gate Model’. In this concept,
ECT tries to extend the gate of its deep-sea terminal to inland terminals by oﬀering
both container handling and hinterland transport services to their own hinterland term-
inals. From 2011, APM Terminals has organised a daily barge service to the Delta Marine
Terminal (DMT) in Moerdijk. In these two examples, one might speak of ‘terminal
haulage’. Vertical integration by the deep-sea terminal operator is regarded as positive
for improving coordination. In this case container cargo for one destination is bundled
within the ﬁrm (the deep-sea terminal operator), which helps to decrease the call size.
Whereas we noticed vertical integration by deep-sea terminal operators, we also see a
prominent role for inland terminal operators in organising container transport. About
40% of the container shuttles from and to Rotterdam are organised by inland terminal
operators (Port of Rotterdam 2013). This number increased during recent years. The
increased involvement of inland terminal operators is positive because they are well
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embedded in the region and are able to bundle cargo in that region which beneﬁts the call
size in the port. Secondly, we observe that there is a strong focus on hardware solutions.
Some new concepts require eﬃcient use of an appropriate organisational structure
(‘orgware’) and a supporting information system (‘software’). Mainly hardware solutions
tend to fail. The underlying reasons are the necessary investments in terminal equipment
or vessels or the additional storage and handling time, resulting in higher operating costs.
The failing factor is that these costs are not fairly allocated to the parties in the transport
chain. Many initiatives have failed because there was a temporary necessity to improve
coordination. Such initiatives are mainly taken in time periods with above-average
growth in container throughput and scarcity of handling capacity at the deep-sea terminal.
When container growth declines or handling capacity increases, the necessity disappears
and initiatives are halted.
Conclusion
The goal of this research has been to analyse factors that may hinder or stimulate a better
future performance of container barging by using a framework rooted in Institutional
Economics. The value of this research is that the performance of the container barge
sector in the port of Rotterdam, and the possibility to improve it, has not been
studied as an isolated issue, but is related to the context of the sector. In recent years,
the container barging’s lagging performance has meant that it has been unable to play
the dominant role in hinterland transport foreseen. The market share of barging in
the supply and transport of containers to the Maasvlakte area has, at best, remained
stable for years.
The performance of container barging in Rotterdam is ineﬃcient due to the long turn-
around times of barges and ineﬃcient terminal planning. Given the long period of time in
which the share of container barging has been stable, it seems hard to improve coordi-
nation. We observe a paradox: on the one hand, many interdependent actors are under-
taking a range of institutional arrangements to improve coordination in container barging,
but at the same time, by a non-existing sense of urgency among the main stakeholders and
their unwillingness to cooperate, the sector’s market share is weakening. The sector’s per-
formance and the interaction between actors take place continuously; the informal and
formal institutions and institutional arrangements are changing with diﬀerent time
periods. Informal institutions are deeply rooted in the container barging sector and
they only change over a very long period. The actors in the Rotterdam container
barging sector are embedded in history with many vertical and horizontal alliances.
Although the sector can be characterised as conservative and individualistic, operating
container barges in the context of family businesses acts with an entrepreneurial and
future-focused spirit. Moreover, the container barging sector in the port of Rotterdam
operates in a tradition of adapting to changes in the market environment. We observe
that this so-called chameleonic behaviour inﬂuences, to a large extent, the current
market organisation. IWT in Rotterdam has a long tradition of trial and error in collective
action. Nevertheless, there is today a high degree of organisation among barge operators
and inland terminal operators. This reﬂects a high level of ability to work on improved
coordination in the future. The present market organisation in container barging is
characterised by a long track record of initiatives to solve existing coordination problems.
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There is considerable discussion on what is needed to give an impetus to container
barging in Rotterdam. It seems that the current policy is lacking or formulated by
means of the traditional government approach. Not all stakeholders are aware that new
roles and new approaches are needed to beneﬁt from opportunities for IWT. The need
for an eﬃcient, sustainable and functioning IWT sector is acknowledged on diﬀerent
levels such as local, regional, national and even European level, but manifests most directly
in the performance of the port(s). This case study concludes that the present division of
property and decision rights in container barging in seaports is a damaging condition
for future improvement. Firstly, there is no contractual relationship between the barge
operator and the deep-sea terminal operator. Secondly, due to the principles of the Man-
nheim Convention, there is no formal relationship between the barge operator or skipper
and infrastructure manager.
The division of property and decision rights is hard to change in the short term. This
research has shown that not only barge operators have an important stake in organising
eﬃcient container barge transport, but also deep-sea terminal operators need to increase
their inﬂuence by diﬀerent forms of vertical integration. The challenge is to develop an ex-
ante methodology that addresses the new challenges in a coherent transition strategy. This
implies that all stakeholders (forwarders, shippers, barge operators, etc.) have to reconsi-
der their roles. It is necessary to work on awareness raising and to recognise the need for
cooperation and interaction between the governments and private companies to improve
the performance of container barging in the port of Rotterdam, and to fulﬁl the changing
needs of society on logistics.
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